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Abstract 
 
This commentary begins by analyzing two textual selections about 
death in the Gorgias (486a7-b4 and 526e4-527a4) in order to 
expand upon Ewegen’s portrayal of Socrates.  I close by briefly 
giving voice to another, perhaps more familiar side of Socrates’ 
rhetorical approach in the dialogue in order to provide some further 
perspective about Ewegen’s claims.    
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Commentary 
 
Ewegen’s paper has provoked me to think about the Gorgias, as 
well as Socrates’ death, in new ways.  In order to explain this, I 
would like to turn first to one of Ewegen’s textual selections and 
examine it in further detail.  Callicles, in his assessment of 
Socrates’ way of life, predicts Socrates’ harsh demise.  He says: 
 
For now, if someone seized you or anybody else (. . .) and 
carried you off to prison, claiming that you were doing an 
injustice when you were not, you know that you would not 
have anything of use to do for yourself, but you would be 
dizzy and gaping, without anything to say; and when you 
stood up in the law court, happening to face a very lowly 
and vicious accuser, you would die, if he wished to demand 
the death penalty for you. (486a7-b4)1 
 
Plato, in his portrayal of Callicles’ foretelling, directs the reader to 
conclude that Callicles’ assessment of Socrates’ fate is correct in a 
way.   Socrates will die unjustly at the hands of accusers who are 
“lowly and vicious” (φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, 486b3).2  He will be 
powerless to save himself.  Socrates does not correct Callicles.  
Rather, he responds by saying that he has found the best way to 
care for his soul, and implies that he will continue to do that. 
(486d) Socrates speaks similarly in the Apology, saying that when 
                                                          
1 Translations from the Gorgias henceforth are by James H. Nichols Jr.  
2 All Greek references are to Burnet’s Oxford edition. 
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one is doing what is best, one must remain there and continue to do 
so, even risking life and limb. (28d-e) Here, in these lines of the 
Gorgias, I contend, following Ewegen’s lead, that Plato directs the 
reader to the ultimate expression of the practice of philosophy—
the art that takes men and makes them physically worse, as 
Callicles indicates—the art that denigrates their physical substance.  
The ultimate expression of the practice of philosophy, then, is to 
die as a philosopher.  It is not only any death that characterizes a 
true philosopher.  Rather, it is a death received from those who are 
“lowly and vicious”.  It is a death imposed by those whose 
assertions, arguments, and ways of life have been fodder for the 
philosopher’s practice throughout his life.  The philosopher 
receives death just as he receives opposition throughout life—by 
acknowledging and absorbing the truth of it—even if that truth is 
part of a caustic or poisonous mixture.  This is what Socrates does 
in the quotation above—he receives Callicles’ argument, including 
the harsh truths mixed with his faulty position.  The one who 
practices philosophy does not, then, respond as a sophistic rhetor—
a man of power—does, with popular opinion or selfish interest as 
one’s touchstone.  Rather, the philosopher responds with truth as 
his only touchstone, “the best such stone,” (486d4) as Socrates 
says in the lines just following the above text.  The philosopher, 
when responding to interlocutors in the language of a soul with 
truth as the point of reference, has the tendency to confound those 
whose touchstone is the mere appearance of truth.   The ultimate 
way in which the philosopher confounds his audience, then, is by 
letting himself die a noble death—ignoble if popular opinion is his 
touchstone, but fine and beautiful if that touchstone is truth.  In this 
way, then, Ewegen’s line of thought sheds new light on philosophy 
as practice for dying.  The Socratic death, it can be argued, is the 
ultimate retreat, or self-effacement, to use Ewegen’s terminology, 
that gives birth to the λόγος.   
 
I would now briefly like to draw our attention to the closing myth, 
which Ewegen mentions toward the end of his paper.  In the 
Gorgias’ myth of the afterlife (523a-527a), the powerful not only 
receive the harshest punishments, (525c-d) but are Socrates’ prime 
example of those whose souls are scarred and deformed from 
living unjustly (See especially 525d-526b).3 In that mythical 
                                                          
3 The question of what the soul is in the Gorgias is worth addressing, at least 
briefly.  Seth Benardete explains that the “soul is simply the soul as rhetoric and 
morality have conceived of it, a metaphorical extension of body with a life of its 
own.” See Benardete 1991, 100.  I do not completely agree with this, but it is a 
view worth considering, since there is no substantive argument for the nature of 
the soul in the Gorgias.  I do contend that an immortal soul is at least implied in 
the dialogue, for instance in the closing myth.  
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rational account, it is the powerful who are least capable of caring 
for their souls in life, and who are therefore the most vulnerable 
after the separation of their souls from their bodies.  After 
describing the way in which souls are tried naked and then either 
punished or rewarded, (523c-526d) Socrates turns Callicles’ 
argument above on its head, saying: 
 
I reproach you that you will not be able to help yourself, 
when you have the judgment and the trial of which I was 
speaking just now; but when you have come to that judge (. 
. . ) and when that one seizes you and brings you in, you 
will be gaping and dizzy there no less than I here, and 
perhaps someone will dishonorably strike you a crack on 
the jaw and completely trample you in the mud. (526e4-
527a4) 
 
According to Socrates, those who are the standard-bearers of 
Calliclean values—the will to power, popular opinion, self-
interest—are vulnerable to the sort of vicious denigration Callicles 
predicts for Socrates, but in a more severe way.  Socrates does not 
go as far as predicting Callicles’ psychic death, though the latter 
foresaw Socrates’ bodily death, but the afterlife punishment 
Socrates describes is more permanent than bodily death.  It is a fate 
suffered either indefinitely or for as long as it takes for one’s soul 
to recover from the denigration and deformation self-imposed on 
one’s immaterial substance.  This mythical rational account could 
be interpreted both literally and metaphorically, as I have argued 
elsewhere.4 Literally, the consequence for allowing one’s soul to 
fester with injustice involves having those offenses exposed, and 
then either suffering fitting purgations until one is cured, or being 
flung into an underworld pit of torment for eternity.  
Metaphorically, one could argue that Callicles’ way of life 
necessitates eventually being exposed—perhaps to oneself, 
perhaps to others—and the result of such exposure will be some 
sort of suffering, which may be very long term.  Either way, those 
who opt for a life like Callicles’ will suffer psychic torments, and 
will be humbled or reduced in both material and immaterial status.  
                                                          
4 Forte 2016, 187-208.  
  Notable metaphorical readings of the myth: Edmonds 2004, 166; Ferrari 2012, 
69; Fussi 2001, 535; Grosso 1971, 75; Guthrie 1975, 307; Emmanuel Levinas, 
according to Stähler 2008, 73; Rowe 2012, 193; Sedley 2009, 53; Stöcklein 
1937, 11, 22-28; and Hirsch 1971, 312. 
  Others, like myself, who explicitly consider a metaphorical reading alongside a 
figurative one: Hitchcock 1974, 129-130; Olympiodorus, Commentary on 
Plato’s Gorgias, 46.3, 46.4; and Russell 2001, 559-564.  
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They will lose the physical substance they treasure most highly—
fine clothes, status, wealth, and so on—and will also have their 
psychic substance, which they have allowed to be ruined—face the 
truth of its future.  This does not end in a death for the soul 
though—let alone a noble one.  The noble death is an empowering 
dignity that the philosopher gets, to follow Ewegen’s line of 
thought and combine it with my own.  This of course implies the 
indestructability of the soul, and is part of Socrates’ thesis that the 
good person cannot be harmed in life or death (527d).  The one 
who seems least powerful then, actually possesses the greatest 
power according to the dialogue, expressed in its final myth: the 
power of invincibility in the face of the ultimate contest—the one 
in which the victory of the soul is at stake.    
 
Though it is clear that I largely agree with Ewegen’s line of 
thinking, I will end here by suggesting that we give voice to 
another side of this account: Socrates’ positive attempt to persuade 
his audience.  On the one hand, though Socrates does advance his 
position, paradoxically, by retreat and self-effacement, on the 
other, he also advances arguments in attempts to persuade his 
audience.  In other words, his approach to his interlocutors is not 
completely portrayed by his receptive posture.  He may even make 
use of rhetorical tricks in advancing his arguments.5 The fact that 
those who argue for the latter largely claim that they are ad 
hominem attacks, leaves open the possibility that any of Socrates’ 
positive attempts to persuade are done for the sake of the souls of 
his audience—so if he is portrayed as arguing against the person, it 
could be simply because he is doing it for the person, and not 
because he sees such techniques as the best way to advance λόγοι.  
Furthermore, many of the conclusions for which he argues are 
incredibly unique and compelling.  They have the distinct “brand” 
of Socrates.  Even if his efforts are more about promoting the λόγοι 
than himself, he is quite present in those λόγοι as their champion.  
But it is not the purpose of Ewegen’s paper, as I understand it, or 
my comments, to add to the vast body of scholarship on Socrates’ 
hypotheses in the Gorgias, or the possibility that he advances these 
using techniques that bear similarity in some ways to the very 
rhetoric he criticizes.  Rather, my comments here are meant to 
echo Ewegen’s portrayal of an underappreciated aspect of the 
complex character that is Socrates in the Gorgias: a figure who 
confounds his audience and advances the λόγος by means of 
withdrawal, receptivity, and an acceptance of the diminution of his 
wealth and social standing even to the point of physical death.       
                                                          
5 Three notables who argue that Socrates commits fallacies are Kahn 1983, 75-
121 (all three of Socrates’ arguments are ad hominem), McTigue 1984, 193-236 
(Socrates commits ad hominem against Polus), and Vlastos 1967, 454-460. 
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